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Leniency policies and illegal transactions

Buccirossi, Paolo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2005 - First version: October 1999, Final version: September 8, 2005

We study the consequences of leniency - reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers - on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions, such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is known that leniency helps deterring illegal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366558

Is the severity of the penalty an effective deterrent? : a strategic approach for the crime of tax evasion

Chiarini, Bruno; Marzano, Elisabetta - 2016

can be tricky, this paper uses the crime strategic model (inspection game) proposed by Tsebelis. This model shows that any … frequency of violation at equilibrium. This result is misleading: payoffs are not independent and the crime game can not be … crime of tax evasion, where the dishonest taxpayers are rational agents, motivated by the comparison of payoffs, considering …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011544186

Do less-violent technologies result in less violence? : A theoretical investigation applied to the use of tasers by law enforcement

McCannon, Bryan - 2009

The use of a taser by law enforcement can substitute for either a gun (a more-violent technology) or a mildly-violent technology (such as pepper spray or hands-on tactics). Which is used affects both the severity of harm when used and the amount of resistance, which affects how often it must be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003864482

Crime, inequality, and the private provision of security

Heufer, Jan - 2011

In a high-crime environment with many high-income citizens, private security companies which offer protection against … crime can flourish. In this article crime is modelled as a game where richer victims yield a higher return on crime, but … with decreasing returns to crime as more criminals choose crime to supplement their income. Private security providers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009579624

Cheap talk about the detection probability

Baumann, Florian; Friehe, Tim - In: International game theory review 15 (2013) 1, pp. 1-16

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009793163

Enforcement of property rights in a barter economy

Hoffmann, Magnus - In: Social choice and welfare 34 (2010) 2, pp. 249-263

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003943869

Property rights in sequential exchange

Arruñada, Benito; Zanarone, Giorgio; Garoupa, Nuno - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011779374

Property rights in sequential exchange

Arruñada, Benito; Zanarone, Giorgio; Garoupa, Nuno - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011800986

Endogenous Property Rights

Guerriero, Carmine - 2016

Although property rights are key, their determinants are still poorly understood. When property is fully protected, some potential buyers with valuation higher than that of original owners are inefficiently excluded from trade due to transaction costs. When property rights are weak,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013007162

Trust and communication in a property rights dilemma

Ahn, T. K.; Balafoutas, Loukas; Batsaikhan, Mongoljin; … - 2016

We study a laboratory social dilemma game in which incentives to steal from others lead to the socially inefficient diversion of resources from production unless the members of a given mini-society can abide by norms of non-theft or engage in low cost collective protection of their members'...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515717