principal cannot commit to high-powered incentives, while if the agent's ex post bargaining position is good, the agent cannot … commit to low-powered incentives. The model may thus explain why risk averse agents sometimes meet high-powered incentive …-powered incentives …

We show that contracting in agency with voluntary participation may involve incentives for the agent's abstention …

design I prove in the paper, that government - as principal - is only capable of applying "perverse" incentives towards the …

Incentives often distort behavior: they induce agents to exert effort but this effort is not employed optimally. This … paper proposes a theory of incentive design allowing for such distorted behavior. At the heart of the theory is a trade …-off between getting the agent to exert effort and ensuring that this effort is used well. The theory covers various moral …

This paper analyzes the case of a principal who wants to provide an agent with proper incentives to explore a … known technology to produce fake successes. This latter option either makes the provision of incentives for honesty … ability to generate further successes. This, in turn, provides incentives for the agent to be honest before a first success. …