We study a market in which k identical and indivisible objects are allocated using a uniform-price auction where n > k … observes the state. We show that there are equilibria in which the auction price is completely uninformative about the state of … there is no ex-post action, the auction price aggregates information. -- Auctions ; Large markets ; Information Aggregation …

-cost firm under incomplete information: a separating auction implies adverse selection and relies substantially on commitment to … allocation and transfer rules. A pooling auction serves as a commitment device against ex-post opportunistic behavior and … alleviates adverse selection. It can earn the investor a higher expected payoff than a separating auction, even when consistency …

’ bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second …- price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first- price …In first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding, second movers may discover the first movers …

of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all bids or only the prices to be paid are revealed to all firms … bidders' costs generally depends on the type and fierceness of the market competition, the specific auction format, and the …

random quality. Innovation quality is not contractible. We compare two procurement mechanisms -- a fixed prize and a first-price … auction. Before the contest, a fixed number of innovators is selected in an entry auction, in order to address the adverse …

In this note, we experimentally examine the relative performance of price-only auctions and multi-attribute auctions …. We do so in procurement settings where the buyer can give the winning bidder incentives to exert effort on non-price … dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically implement the surplus maximizing mechanism. Our experiment confirms …

allocation rules (first- vs. second-price - auction vs. fair division game). The data analysis of the sealed-bid, private value …-contests compares the bid functions, some features of the bidding behavior as well as the efficiency rates and the price expectations in …

allocation rules (first- vs. second-price - auction vs. fair division game). The data analysis of the sealed-bid, private value …-contests compares the bid functions, some features of the bidding behavior as well as the efficiency rates and the price expectations in …

: first-price and second-price auctions supplemented with Crémer–McLean lotteries. In the experiment, subjects cannot opt out … auction works as predicted. In each treatment, the seller's actual revenue is significantly higher than the equilibrium … revenue. Panel data analysis shows that overbidding persists throughout all rounds in the second-price treatment, while it …

ensuing auction, leading to loss of efficiency and eliminating the revenue dominance typically observed in first-price …The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of … likely to affect the bidding behavior in firstprice (but not second-price) auctions. We test experimentally a setup in which …