We study the allocative challenges that governmental and nonprofit organizations face when tasked with equitable and efficient rationing of a social good among agents whose needs (demands) realize sequentially and are possibly correlated. As one example, early in the COVID-19 pandemic, the...

We develop a computational method to identify all pure strategy equilibrium pointsin the strategy space of the two-player, two-action repeated games played by Q-learnerswith one period memory. In order to approximate the dynamics of these Q-learners,we construct a graph of pure strategy mutual...

This research states the stylised n (more than two) players' splitting problem as a mathematical programme, relying on definitions of the values of the game and problem stationarity to generate tractable reduced forms, and derives the known solutions according to the properties of pertaining...

We study how changes to the informativeness of signals in Bayesian games and single-agent decision problems affect the distribution of equilibrium actions. A more precise private signal about an unknown state of the world leads to an mean-preserving spread of an agent's beliefs. Focusing on...

We study the experimentation dynamics of a decision maker (DM) in a two-armed bandit setup (Bolton and Harris [1999]), where the agent holds ambiguous beliefs regarding the distribution of the return process of one arm and is certain about the other one. The DM entertains Multiplier preferences...

We study how information affects equilibria and welfare in games. For an agent, more precise information about an unknown state of the world leads to a mean-preserving spread of beliefs. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions to obtain either a non-increasing mean or a...

Problem definition:We consider a clinic with strategic patients who choose between making an appointment, incurring an indirect wait cost, and walking in, bearing an inconvenience cost and a risk of being rejected. Patients are of two types,differentiated through their indirect waiting cost. We...

In an experts-assisted decision making paradigm, the information collection design becomes a strategic variable under a weak assumption that the final decision is dependent on the design used to collect information as well. As a result, the same information of the experts and the decision maker...

Many Bayesian Confirmation Measures have been proposed so far. They are used to assess the degree to which an evidence (or premise) E supports or contradicts an hypothesis (or conclusion) H, making use of prior probability P(H), posterior probability P(H|E) and of probability of evidence P(E)....

We endogenize the precision parameter "lambda" of logit quantal response equilibrium (LQRE) (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). In the first stage of an endogenous quantal response equilibrium (EQRE), each player chooses precision optimally subject to costs, given correct beliefs over other players'...