Evidence production at trial, the accumulation of patents in a technological race, and lobbying are contests that often involve strategic choices over a discrete set of options. The literature has primarily focused on games with continuous effort choices. We fill this gap by studying a...

In this paper, we study a two-stage rent-seeking game. In the first stage, contestants compete a-la-Tullock; in the second stage, the winner can resell the rent a-la-Coase. We consider a complete information Tullock game in which the contestants have different valuations for the rent. The...

In the traditional formulation of rent-seeking games, increasing returns to effort are characterized by an exponent r 1. However,when the value of rent is normalized to 1, the players’ effort levels A and B will typically be less than 1. Thus, when A < 1 and r > 1, the value of Ar decreases as r...</1>