It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic …" or that "could learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order …

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic … that could "learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order to …

factors. We illustrate our algorithms in a learning version of the classical newsvendor problem, where due to lost sales, only …

are rare. Thus, even in a world of simple learning agents, coordination behavior can take on some surprising forms. …

of play towards Nash equilibrium in repeated strategic interactions. We study behavior in a p-beauty contest experiment … understand better how subjects with different cognitive abilities learn differently, we estimate a structural model of learning … ability to that of character skills, and find that both cognition and personality affect behavior and learning. More agreeable …