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Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? : an experimental investigation

Cabrales, Antonio; Feri, Francesco; Gottardi, Piero; … - 2018

This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information. We find that the poor quality of the information transmitted leads to a collapse of information markets. The reasons for this are surprising given the previous experimental results on cheap-talk games....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011822038

On the Bright Side of Correlation Information Transmission

Battaggion, Maria Rosa; Karakoç, Gülen - 2022

that although correlation tightens the conditions on preferences for a truth-telling equilibrium, in the presence of … uncertainty, a high level of correlation may discipline the strongly biased expert and may foster the informational content of the … experts’ advice under high uncertainty about correlation. In contrast to what may be expected, it may be optimal for the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014236650

Information Sharing in Private Value Lottery Contest

Wu, Zenan - 2017

We study the incentives of players to disclose information on their private valuations of the prize ahead of a rent-seeking contest. We show that information sharing can arise in equilibrium if types are concentrated enough, whereas sharing information is strictly dominated if types are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012956214

Cheap Talk Advertising in Auctions

Jewitt, Ian; Li, Daniel Z. - 2021

This paper explores how a seller should transmit product information to bidders with horizontally differentiated preferences. Under cheap-talk, we show that, in an informative equilibrium, the seller provides less precise information for more popular product attributes. Second, for any given...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013250400

Strategic communication : an experimental investigation

Eckartz, Katharina; Ehses-Friedrich, Christiane - 2014

In this paper we attempt to compare theoretically and experimentally three models of strategic information transmission. In particular we focus on the models by Crawford & Sobel (1982), Lai (2010) and Ehses-Friedrich (2011). These three models differ in the information that the receiver...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260085

Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer

Sadakane, Hiroshi - 2017

We examine multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer in the framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982). In our model, an informed expert can send messages to an uninformed decision maker more than once, and the uninformed decision maker can pay money to the informed expert...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671657

Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks

Förster, Manuel - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 1, pp. 253-295

We develop a dynamic framework of strategic information transmission through cheap talk in a social network. Privately informed agents have different preferences about the action to be implemented by each agent and repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in the network. We first characterize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012020319

Noisy talk

Blume, Andreas; Board, Oliver J.; Kawamura, Kohei - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 2 (2007) 4, pp. 395-440

We investigate strategic information transmission with communication error, or noise. Our main finding is that adding noise can improve welfare. With quadratic preferences and a uniform type distribution, welfare can be raised for almost every bias level by introducing a sufficiently small...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702289

Cheap Talk with Correlated Information

Chand, A.K.S. - 2016

experts correlation unambiguously tightens the conditions on preferences for a truth-telling equilibrium. However, with … multiple experts the effect of correlation on the incentives to report information truthfully is non-monotonic. In particular …, while very small and very large correlation levels are detrimental for truth-telling, intermediate levels of correlation may …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012987832

Cheap talk with correlated signals

Chand, A. K. S.; Currarini, Sergio; Ursino, Giovanni - 2013

one sender case, we show that correlation unambiguously tightens the existence conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium …. We then generalize the model to an arbitrary number of senders, and we find that, in this case, the effect of correlation … on the incentives to report information truthfully is non monotone, and correlation may discipline senders' equilibrium …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010189326