Showing 1 - 10 of 43
We model a dynamic public good contribution game, where players are (naturally) formed into groups. The groups are exogenously placed in a sequence, with limited information available to players about their groups’ position in the sequence. Contribution decisions are made by players...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014237520
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012249637
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010257515
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010257517
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360439
We consider the well-analyzed abatement game (Barrett 1994) and prove that correlation among the players (nations) can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs. As these games are potential games, correlated equilibrium - CE - (Aumann 1974, 1987) cannot improve upon Nash; however we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010462720
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009736818
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012299316
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012173549
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012167674