This paper presents a strategic model of risk-taking behavior in the framework of a continuous time contest. Formally, we analyze a dynamic game in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian Motion with drift. Only the player who stops his process at the highest value...

The paper presents the results of a novel experiment testing the effects of environment complexity on strategic behavior, using a centipede game. Behavior in the centipede game has been explained either by appealing to failures of backward induction or by calling for preferences that induce...

The ultimatum heuristic is a decision-making tendency discernible in graphical plots of mixed-motive noncooperative games. As such, it can serve also as a solution approach, backsolving, predicting and explaining outcomes better than the mainstay Nash equilibrium concept whenever data for the...

This paper introduces extensive form generalized games, a general framework for modeling dynamic strategic settings where players' feasible strategies depend on the strategies chosen by others. Extensive form generalized games nest a variety of existing game theoretic frameworks, including games...

I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has a range of applications, including rent seeking, R&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of the commons. I show that information about other...

Riedel and Sass (2013) propose a framework for normal form games where players can use imprecise probabilistic devices. We extend this strategic use of objective ambiguity to extensive form games. We show that with rectangularity of Ellsberg strategies we have dynamic consistency in the sense of...

An infinite-horizon perfect-information "centipede" game is studied. The unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) in pure strategies has each player choose, at each opportunity, to terminate the game. In contrast, mixed strategies can yield equilibrium cooperation described as follows: for...

We study signaling in dynamic contests with heterogeneous players. A privately-informed challenger faces a sequence of rivals of known types. The type of future rivals determines which signal the challenger wants to produce, whereas the strategic response of current rivals determines the extent...