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Play it again : partner choice, reputation building and learning in restarting, finitely-repeated dilemma games

Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis G. - 2013

remains unclear. In each of six treatments that vary the cooperation premium and the informational basis for reputation … forces of (a) learning about the benefits of reputation, and (b) learning about backward unraveling. We find, inter alia …, that with a high cooperation premium and good information, investment in reputation grows across sets of finitely …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010126752

Reputation and Cooperation in Defence

Hugh-Jones, David - 2011

future security. We argue that a group's reputation is a public good with a natural weakest - link structure. We extend the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013132902

Play it Again : Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning in Restarting, Finitely-Repeated Dilemma Games

Kamei, Kenju - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013076291

Reputation Concerns Limit Misrepresentation in Social Decision Making

Steinel, Wolfgang; De Dreu, Carsten K. W. - 2005

Economic and social psychological models of human behavior suggest that concern with one's reputation limits strategic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014068939

Reputational Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law

Ekmekci, Mehmet - 2020

strategic player by making it more difficult to build a reputation, but can also benefit the player who can pretend to be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012851185

Arms races and conflict : experimental evidence

Abbink, Klaus; Dong, Lu; Huang, Lingbo - 2019

We study escalation and aggression in an experimental first-strike game in which two participants play multiple rounds of a money-earning task. In each round, both players can spend money to accumulate weapons. The player with more weapons can spend money to strike against the other player,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011975495

Preventive wars

Abbink, Klaus; Dong, Lu; Huang, Lingbo - 2022

The rise of a new power may lead the dominant power to seek a preventive war. We study this scenario in an experimental two-stage bargaining game. In each stage, the rising power makes a bargaining offer and the declining power must choose whether to accept it or fight. Between the two stages,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012801942

When Does Terrorism Occur : Game-Theoretic Analysis and Offense-Defense Balance

Kim, Jin Yeub - 2021

Offense-defense theory argues that wars are more likely in offense-dominant periods. I study how this claim can be challenged when it comes to making predictions about terrorism. To do so, I consider a model of continuous-time conflict between a status quo state and a terrorist, who develops...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013221797

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

Abbink, Klaus; Brandts, Jordi; Herrmann, Benedikt; … - 2009

We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The theoretical prediction is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003799822

War and relatedness

Spolaore, Enrico; Wacziarg, Romain - 2009

We develop a theory of interstate conflict in which the degree of genealogical relatedness between populations has a positive effect on their conflict propensities because more closely related populations, on average, tend to interact more and develop more disputes over sets of common issues. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003854499