We consider social choice functions (SCFs) that are locally robust ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible (LOBIC) with respect to correlated priors. We model such priors using a betweenness property and assume the coexistence of both positively and negatively correlated priors. We introduce the...

This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one individual. The matching market contains some couples who view the pair of jobs as complements. First, we show by means of an example that a stable matching may fail to exist even when both couples and...

The paper considers a voting model where each voter's type is her preference. The type graph for a voter is a graph whose vertices are the possible types of the voter. Two vertices are connected by an edge in the graph if the associated types are "neighbors." A social choice function is locally...

We provide a full characterisation of the set of trading equilibria (in which all goods are traded at a positive price) in a strategic market game (as introduced by Shapley and Shubik),for both the "buy and sell" and the "buy or sell" versions of this model under standard assumptions on the...