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Pooling or fooling? : an experiment on signaling

Feri, Francesco; Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A.; Ponti, … - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 176 (2020), pp. 582-596

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431697

Three problems of liquidity under asymmetric information

Carré, Sylvain - 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012119129

Costly voluntary disclosure in a signaling game

Pecorino, Paul; VanBoening, Mark Virgil - In: Review of law and economics : publ. in cooperation with … 15 (2019) 2, pp. 1-32

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012197398

Information acquisition and voluntary disclosure in an export-processing system

Gao, Long; Li, Zhaolin; Shou, Biying - In: Production and operations management : an international … 23 (2014) 5, pp. 802-816

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010372388

Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters

Aoyagi, Masaki - In: Games and economic behavior 87 (2014), pp. 485-496

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011304936

To tell or not to tell : essays on corporate financial disclosure

Zhang, Li - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011297695

Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning

Nikandrova, Arina; Pancs, Romans - In: Journal of economic theory 171 (2017), pp. 174-212

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011777006

Voluntary disclosure of a discriminated against characteristic

Liu, Liqun; Rettenmaier, Andrew J.; Saving, Thomas R. - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 120 (2015), pp. 94-103

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011572861

Costly voluntary disclosure in a screening game

Pecorino, Paul; VanBoening, Mark Virgil - In: International review of law and economics 44 (2015), pp. 16-28

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011574866

Communication games with optional verification

Schopohl, Simon - 2016

We consider a Sender-Receiver game in which the Sender can choose between sending a cheap-talk message, which is costless, but also not verified and a costly verified message. While the Sender knows the true state of the world, the Receiver does not have this information, but has to choose an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576182