Similar Search Results

Deterrence, peer effect, and legitimacy in anti-corruption policy-making : an experimental analysis

Boly, Amadou; Gillanders, Robert; Miettinen, Topi - 2016

Official A at almost all individual detection levels. This 'legitimacy' effect may help explain why anti-corruption policies …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011568192

Predictive Policing : An Information Design Approach

Ichihashi, Shota - 2022

opportunities. Police observes information about citizens' types and allocates search efforts to catch citizens who commit crimes. I … show that the police who has full information about citizens may fail to deter any crimes. An information structure that … minimizes crime rate provides the police with information about citizens who face low returns to crime without identifying …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014076370

Optimal contest design when policing damaging behavior

Gilpatric, Scott M.; Hong, Ye - In: Games 14 (2023) 3, pp. 1-22

We consider the design of a contest in which the prize may motivate not only productive efforts, but also some damaging aggressive behavior by contestants. The organizer must choose prizes and an enforcement regime defined as a limit on how much aggressiveness will be tolerated and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014426263

Optimal Contest Design when Policing Damaging Aggressive Behavior

Gilpatric, Scott M. - 2020

We consider the design of a contest in which the prize may motivate not only productiveeffort but also some damaging aggressive behavior by contestants. The organizer must chooseprizes and an enforcement regime defined as a limit on how much aggressiveness will betolerated and the probability of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012825802

Fair salaries and the moral costs of corruption

Abbink, Klaus - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001510400

The Moonlighting Game An Experimental Study on Reciprocity and Retribution

Abbink, Klaus; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Renner, Elke - 2001

We introduce the moonlighting game. Player A can take money from or pass money to player B, who can either return money or punish player A. Thus, our game allows to study both positively and negatively reciprocal behaviour. One-shot experiments were conducted with and without the possibility of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014141311

Fair Play : Notes on the Algorithmic Soccer Referee

Madison, Michael J. - 2021

augment human deciders. Fair play stands in for justice. They are combined and set in a polycentric system of governance, with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013240147

Fair salaries and the moral costs of corruption

Abbink, Klaus - 2000

In a bribery experiment, we test the hypothesis that distributive fairness considerations make relatively well-paid public officials less corruptible. Corrupt decisions impose damages to workers whose wage is varied in two treatments. However, there is no apparent difference in behaviour.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538846

Rewards and punishments : informal contracting through social preferences

Chassang, Sylvain; Zehnder, Christian - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 1145-1179

This paper develops a positive model of informal contracting in which rewards and punishments are not determined by an ex ante optimal plan but instead express the ex post moral sentiments of the arbitrating party. We consider a subjective performance evaluation problem in which a principal can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671838

Are equilibrium strategies unaffected by incentives? : the police game

Hirshleifer, Jack; Rasmusen, Eric - 1990

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000818158