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Effects of institutional history and leniency on collusive corruption and tax evasion

Buckenmaier, Johannes; Dimant, Eugen; Mittone, Luigi - 2018 - This version: May, 2018

corruption and tax compliance. We explore this through a formal leniency program. In our experiment, we nest collusive corruption …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011894106

Effects of institutional history and leniency on collusive corruption and tax evasion

Buckenmaier, Johannes; Dimant, Eugen; Mittone, Luigi - 2018 - This version: June 5, 2018

corruption and tax compliance. We explore this through a formal leniency program. In our experiment, we nest collusive corruption …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011861538

Collusive Tax Evasion and Social Norms

Abraham, Martin A. - 2015

the model's predictions in a laboratory experiment. Because collusive tax evasion involves social interaction, this paper …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013028921

Is the severity of the penalty an effective deterrent? : a strategic approach for the crime of tax evasion

Chiarini, Bruno; Marzano, Elisabetta - 2016

can be tricky, this paper uses the crime strategic model (inspection game) proposed by Tsebelis. This model shows that any … frequency of violation at equilibrium. This result is misleading: payoffs are not independent and the crime game can not be … crime of tax evasion, where the dishonest taxpayers are rational agents, motivated by the comparison of payoffs, considering …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011544186

Norm manipulation, norm evasion : experimental evidence

Bicchieri, Cristina; Chavez, Alex K. - In: Economics & philosophy 29 (2013) 2, pp. 175-198

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010226642

Norm Manipulation, Norm Evasion : Experimental Evidence

Bicchieri, Cristina; Chavez, Alex K. - 2012

Using an economic bargaining game, we tested for the existence of two phenomena related to social norms, namely norm manipulation – the selection of an interpretation of the norm that best suits an individual – and norm evasion – the deliberate, private violation of a social norm. We found...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014164498

Leniency policies and illegal transactions

Buccirossi, Paolo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2005 - First version: October 1999, Final version: September 8, 2005

We study the consequences of leniency - reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers - on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions, such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is known that leniency helps deterring illegal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366558

Can Strategic Uncertainty Help Deter Tax Evasion? An Experiment on Auditing Rules

Tan, Fangfang - 2014

This paper adds to the economic-psychological research on tax compliance by experimentally testing a simple auditing rule that induces strategic uncertainty among taxpayers. Under this rule, termed the bounded rule, taxpayers are informed of the maximum number of audits by a tax authority, so...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013066938

Evasive lying in strategic communication

Khalmetski, Kiryl; Rockenbach, Bettina; Werner, Peter - In: Journal of public economics 156 (2017), pp. 59-72

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011824095

Towards a Three-Player Game Modelization of Corporate Tax Evasion

Neifar, Souhir - 2018

This paper models corporate tax evasion as a game among three players: tax authorities, shareholders and the manager in order to understand the behavior of corporate tax evasion (CTE), its causes and the possible mechanisms that can alleviate it. For this purpose, a three-level programming is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012913998