We show how limited disclosure of the central bank’s private information to select audiences facilitates policy flexibility between scheduled monetary policy meetings. We also clarify when such disclosure is welfare-enhancing. Full paper available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109371

We study the two-way interaction between central banks and financial markets using a beauty contest framework. The analysis identifies when asset prices reveal useful information about fundamentals and when they reflect back the central bank's pronouncements. In equilibrium, the central bank is...

We introduce cautious expectations to a macroprudential policy model where average growth is traded off against growth-at-risk (GaR). Policymakers with cautious expectations estimate the optimal weight to apply to risk signals, creating biased, historically dependent crisis forecasts. They...

The interplay between financial and monetary stability has received considerable attention in recent times, from policymakers and academics alike. This article reviews the broad themes that have emerged in the recent literature and highlights several key issues that merit attention by...