This paper studies monetary policy under discretion when the central bank ex ante determines information to be acquired and made public. In a general setting, wherein a monetary instrument signals the central bank's private information, I show that an optimal information policy comprises the...

In this paper we examine whether publishing the information underlying the central bank's decisions is socially desirable. We show that opacity may lead to the same equilibrium as transparency. However, additional equilibria may emerge under opacity with adverse consequences for welfare....

What were the distributional consequences of the recent demonetization in India? Can the implementation of demonetization be improved to mitigate its distributional impact? This paper answers these questions using a dynamic contracting model featuring costly state verification and...

Financial markets and macroeconomic environments are often characterized by positive externalities. In these environments, transparency may reduce expected welfare from an ex-ante point of view: public announcements serve as a focal point for higher-order beliefs and affect agents' behaviour...

We develop a dynamic two-period generalized beauty contest to study the optimal level of publicity when disclosed information is subject to multiplier effects inherent to social learning. We build upon the static case, where all agents receive a private signal about an unknown fundamental state...

We develop a dynamic two-period generalized beauty contest to study the optimal level of publicity when disclosed information is subject to multipliereffects inherent to social learning. We build upon the static case, where all agents receive a private signal about an unknown fundamental state...

We develop a two-period generalized beauty contest to study the optimal level of publicity when disclosed information is subject to multiplier effects. We build upon the static case, where all agents receive a private signal about an unknown fundamental state and only a fraction of all agents...