We use elementary game-theoretical concepts to compare domestic equilibria with and without marriage. In particular, we examine the effects of marriage legislation, matrimonial property regime, and divorce court sentencing practice, on the decision to marry, and on the choice of game conditional...

We show that the descendants of ancient farmers may have an interest in marrying among themselves, and thus maintaining the gendered division of labour, originally justiÖed on comparativeadvantage grounds by the advent of the plough, even after they emigrate to a modern industrial economy where...

We show that the descendants of ancient farmers may have an interest in maintaining the gendered division of labour originally justified on comparative-advantage grounds by the advent of the plough even after they emigrate to a modern industrial economy where individual productivity depends on...

We show that the descendants of ancient farmers may have an interest in marrying among themselves, and thus maintaining the gendered division of labour, originally justified on comparative-advantage grounds by the advent of the plough, even after they emigrate to a modern industrial economy...

We use elementary game-theoretical concepts to compare domestic equilibria with and without marriage. In particular, we examine the effects of marriage legislation, matrimonial property regime, and divorce court sentencing practice, on the decision to marry, and on the choice of game conditional...

Die Autoren untersuchen anhand unterschiedlicher Modelle die steuerlichen Maßnahmen, um den Bedürfnissen kinderreicher Familien gerecht zu werden. Unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen könnte sich die Steuerbelastung an der Familiengröße orientieren und kindbedingte Erfordernisse...