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We study the effect on coordination in a minimum-effort game of a leader's gender depending on whether the leader is democratically elected or is randomly-selected. Leaders use non-binding messages to try to convince followers to coordinate on the Pareto-efficient equilibrium. We find that teams...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012964995
We study the effect on coordination in a minimum-effort game of a leader's gender depending on whether the leader is democratically elected or is randomly-selected. Leaders use non-binding messages to try to convince followers to coordinate on the Pareto-efficient equilibrium. We find that teams...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012965375
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014391964
Standard observed characteristics explain only part of the differences between men and women in education choices and labor market trajectories. Using an experiment to derive students’ levels of overconfidence, and preferences for competitiveness and risk, this paper investigates whether these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009787489
Standard observed characteristics explain only part of the differences between men and women in education choices and labor market trajectories. Using an experiment to derive students' levels of overconfidence, and preferences for competitiveness and risk, this paper investigates whether these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009792974
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011418304
Important gender differences in earnings and career trajectories persist. Particularly, in professions such as business. Gender differences in competitiveness have been proposed as a potential explanation. Using an incentivized measure of competitiveness, this paper investigates whether...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376220
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011408103
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011758107
We study the effect on coordination in a minimum-effort game of a leader's gender depending on whether the leader is democratically elected or is randomly-selected. Leaders use non-binding messages to try to convince followers to coordinate on the Pareto-efficient equilibrium. We find that teams...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011607378