We study general equilibrium with private and incomplete state verification. Trade is agreed ex ante, that is, before private information is received. It is useful to define a list of bundles as a derivative good that gives an agent the right to receive one of the bundles in the list....

We introduce a two-period economy with asymmetric information about the state of nature that occurs in the second period. Each agent is endowed with an information structure that describes her (incomplete) ability to prove whether or not a state has occurred. We show that if the number of states...

This paper studies exchange economies in which agents have differential information about the goods that the other agents bring to the market. To study such a setting, it is useful to distinguish goods not only by their physical characteristics, but also by the agent that brings them to the...

We consider a general equilibrium model of trade ex ante with differential information in which agents choose plans of state-contingent lists of bundles. Being unable to verify that the state of nature is s and not t, an agent has to accept the delivery of any bundle in the list for delivery in...

An economy with ex ante markets for future delivery contingent on ex post spot market prices is considered. Since spot prices are publicly observed ex post, this framework bypasses the enforcement problems that may arise as a result of differential information about states of nature....

In the presence of events that are seen as ambiguous by all agents in an economy, if preferences are representable by expected uncertain utility functions (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2014), general equilibrium does not typically exist.

The notion of uncertain delivery is extended to study exchange economies in which agents have different abilities to distinguish between goods (for example a car in good condition versus a car in bad condition). In this setting, it is useful to distinguish goods not only by their physical...

In economies with uncertain delivery, agents trade their endowments for lists instead of bundles. A list specifies a set of bundles such that the agent has the right to receive one of them. In this paper, with continuity conditions on private beliefs about the bundle that will be delivered, we...