We construct a general equilibrium model with a protected intermediate sector and analyze the effectiveness of trade reform for a small open economy where bureaucratic corruption arises because of trade protection. Intermediaries are employed by the producers in order to avoid paying the import...

We use the HOS model of international trade to find a link between trading (including domestic trading or retailing) costs and pattern of trade, not just its effect on volume of trade. Even if we use symmetric iceberg type trading costs, unlike conventional unit cost approach, we generate...

We use the HOSV model of trade to find out a link between corruption and the pattern of trade, not just its effect on the volume of trade. We prove that greater corruption in labor-abundant countries will restrict the volume of world trade while corrupt capital-abundant countries promote trade....

We use the HOSV model of trade to find out a link between corruption and the pattern of trade, not just its effect on the volume of trade. We prove that greater corruption in labor-abundant countries will restrict the volume of world trade while corrupt capital-abundant countries promote trade....

Chapter 1: Tariff-Rebate on Intermediate Inputs for Exportables in a Two-period Model with Learning-from-Exporting -- Chapter 2: Trade Policy during COVID -- Chapter 3: Ronald W. Jones as a General Equilibrium Theorist in a Classical Mold: International Trade through the Ricardo-Viner-Jones...