General equilibrium (GE) theory faces several related challenges. Classical theories of out‐of‐equilibrium adjustment are intuitive but implausibly centralized. Further, standard restrictions on individual preferences place little structure on aggregate excess demand functions. Amongst other...

Prior laboratory experiments have studied general equilibrium economies constructed from \induced preferences" for artificial goods. We introduce new methods that allow us to study economies constructed instead from subjects' actual, \homegrown" preferences. Our subjects reveal their preferences...

Prior laboratory experiments have studied general equilibrium economies constructed from "induced preferences" for artificial goods. We introduce new methods that allow us to study economies constructed instead from subjects' actual, "homegrown" preferences. Our subjects reveal their preferences...

Crockett, Spear and Sunder [2005] propose an algorithm whereby boundedly rational agents with standard neoclassical preferences learn competitive equilibrium in a repeated static exchange economy. In this paper, a laboratory market is instituted to examine the hypothesis that people are at least...

Crockett, Spear and Sunder [2006] propose a simple learning rule through which an informationally decentralized, repeated, static pure exchange economy populated by agents with standard neoclassical preferences will coordinate on a competitive equilibrium. In this paper a laboratory market is...