Showing 1 - 10 of 49
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003456020
This paper presents the results of an empirical test concerning the auction model of Gilbert and Newbery (1982). The study uses data on German companies in order to analyze expenditures for technology licenses. Aside of standard control variables the motives for innovation expenditures are also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002822031
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000962902
We briefly survey several insights about value and revenue maximization in multi-object auctions and apply them to the German (and Austrian) UMTS auction. In particular, we discuss in detail the exposure problem that caused firms in Germany to pay almost Euro 20 billion for nothing.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409210
This paper estimates the effects of temporary driver's license suspensions on driving behavior. A little known rule in … should have their license suspended for one month. My regression discontinuity design exploits the quasi-random assignment of … license suspensions caused by the 365-days cut-off and shows that 1-month license suspensions lower the probability of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011641567
The third generation UMTS auction in Germany raised an enormous amount of revenue, and at the same time achieved a more competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and presents a game theoretic explanation of observed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011400807
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001760284
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001739488
We briefly survey several insights about value and revenue maximization in multi-object auctions and apply them to the German (and Austrian) UMTS auction. In particular, we discuss in detail the exposure problem that caused firms in Germany to pay almost Euro 20 billion for nothing.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001673509
The third generation UMTS auction in Gremany raised an enormous amount of revenue, and the same time achieved a more competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and presents a game theoretic explanation of observed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001624203