In diesem Beitrag wird ein Oligopolmodell der Innovationsaktivität entwickelt und mit Daten aus dem Mannheimer Innovationspanel geschätzt. Das Modell erlaubt es, bei der empirischen Umsetzung auf die Verwendung von Marktanteilsdaten und Nachfrageelastizitäten zu verzichten, die typischerweise...

This paper examines empirically the relationship between innovation and market structure within a simultaneous framework at the industry level of aggregation. We use a model in which R&D affects both, demand and cost conditions. An optimization process leads to optimal industry R&D expenditure...

We examine the relationship between fragmented intellectual property (IP) rights and the innovative performance of firms, taking into consideration the role played by in-licensing of IP. We find that firms facing more fragmented IP landscapes have a higher probability of in-licensing. For firms...

Die Corona-Pandemie und die damit einhergehenden Einschränkungen in fast allen gesellschaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen Bereichen beeinflussen seit einigen Wochen das Leben der Menschen weltweit. Neben der möglichen Strategie, eine Herdenimmunität durch Infizierung von 60 bis 70 Prozent der...

We provide an evaluation of the impact of public subsidy schemes that aimed to support the development of basic broadband infrastructure in rural areas of Germany. Such subsidies are subject to state aid control by the European Commission (EC). While the EC increasingly recognises the role of...

This paper analyses the relationship between past innovation output, competition, and future innovation input in a dynamic econometric setting. We distinguish two dimensions of competition that correspond to the concepts of product substitutability and entry barriers due to fixed costs. Based on...

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex-ante...

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...