This work refers to analyses of matching processes on occupational labour markets in Germany. Up to now, all studies in this field are based on the crucial assumption of separate occupational labour markets. I outlined some theoretical considerations that occupational markets are probably not...

This paper analyzes the determinants of annual worker reallocation across disaggregated occupations in western Germany for the period 1985-2003. Employing data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, the pattern of average occupational mobility is documented. Worker reallocation is found to be...

The role of the 2000’s German labour market reforms in boosting the German economy has been widely discussed. Considering that one of the main objectives of these reforms was to improve the matching process on the labour market, I use high-frequency administrative data to present new details...

There is an ongoing discussion that centres on the German labour market reforms (2003- 2005) and the role of these reforms in boosting the German economy. Considering that one of the main objectives of the reforms was to improve the matching process on the labour market, I use rich,...

This paper analyzes the determinants of annual worker reallocation across disaggregated occupations in western Germany for the period 1985-2003. Employing data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, the pattern of average occupational mobility is documented. Worker reallocation is found to be...

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex-ante...

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex-ante...