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Does better disease management in primary care reduce hospital costs? : evidence from English primary care

Dusheiko, Mark; Gravelle, Hugh; Martin, Stephen; Rice, Nigel - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009238124

The effect of financial incentives on gatekeeping doctors: evidence from a natural experiment

Dusheiko, Mark; Gravelle, Hugh; Jacobs, Rowena; Smith, … - In: Journal of health economics 25 (2006) 3, pp. 449-478

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003319088

Performance signals in the public sector : the case of health care

Gravelle, Hugh; Smith, Peter; Xavier, Ana - In: Oxford economic papers 55 (2003) 1, pp. 81-103

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001723817

The effect of budgets on doctor behaviour : evidence from a natural experiment

Dusheiko, Mark; Gravelle, Hugh; Jacobs, Rowena; Smith, Peter - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001736340

Does better disease management in primary care reduce hospital costs? : evidence from English primary care

Dusheiko, Mark; Gravelle, Hugh; Martin, Stephen; Rice, Nigel - In: Journal of health economics 30 (2011) 5, pp. 919-932

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009356338

Does better disease management in primary care reduce hospital costs?

Dusheiko, Mark; Gravelle, Hugh; Martin, Stephen; Rice, Nigel - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009309738

Quality incentives in a regulated market with imperfect information and switching costs : capitation in general practice

Gravelle, Hugh; Masiero, Giuliano - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001488583

Quality incentives in a regulated market with imperfect information and switching costs : capitation in general practice

Gravelle, Hugh; Masiero, Giuliano - In: Journal of health economics 19 (2000) 6, pp. 1067-1088

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001526429

Specification of Financial Incentives for Quality in Health Care Contracts

Fichera, Eleonora - 2013

We consider how purchasers and providers negotiate the quality element of contracts when the purchasers are required to link a fixed proportion of revenue to quality. A simple model predicts that the complexity of the quality element will depend on purchaser and provider characteristics. Using...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013089071

The effect of hospital choice and competition on inequalities in waiting times

Moscelli, Giuseppe; Gravelle, Hugh; Siciliani, Luigi - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 205 (2023), pp. 169-201

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014416111