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On the existence of efficient and fair extensions of communication values for connected graphs
Béal, Sylvain; Casajus, André; Hüttner, Frank - In: Economics letters 146 (2016), pp. 103-106
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011619142
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Centrality rewarding shapley and Myerson values for undirected graph games
Chmelnitskaja, Anna B.; Laan, Gerard van der; Talman, Dolf - 2016
In this paper we introduce two values for cooperative games with communication graph structure. For cooperative games … can be obtained by any coalition of players, but does not take into account the role of the players when communication … between players is restricted. Existing values for communication graph games as the Myerson value and the average tree …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011531120
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Games with Graph Restricted Communication and Levels Structure of Cooperation
Tejada, Oriol - 2017
We analyze surplus allocation problems where cooperation between agents is restricted both by a communication graph and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012951558
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Allocation rules for cooperative games with graph and hypergraph communication structure
Zhang, Guang - 2018
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011899371
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Centrality Rewarding Shapley and Myerson Values for Undirected Graph Games
Khmelnitskaya, Anna - 2016
In this paper we introduce two values for cooperative games with communication graph structure. For cooperative games … can be obtained by any coalition of players, but does not take into account the role of the players when communication … between players is restricted. Existing values for communication graph games as the Myerson value and the average tree …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012983828
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Values for cooperative games over graphs and games with inadmissible coalitions
Hellman, Ziv; Peretz, Ron - 2015
We suppose that players in a cooperative game are located within a graph structure, such as a social network or supply route, that limits coalition formation to coalitions along connected subsets within the graph. This in turn leads to a more general study of coalitional games in which there are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010506831
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The V L Value for Network Games
Hendrickx, Ruud L. P.; Borm, Peter; Brink, René van den; … - 2005
In this paper we consider a proper Shapley value (the V L value) for cooperative network games. This value turns out to have a nice interpretation. We compute the V L value for various kinds of networks and relate this value to optimal strategies in an associated matrix game
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064942
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The Two-Step Average Tree Value for Graph and Hypergraph Games
Kang, Liying - 2020
undirected communication graphs or hypergraphs. The solution can be considered as an alternative for both the average tree … general these two approaches lead to different solution concepts. When each component in the underlying communication … tree value on the subclass of TU games with semi-cycle-free hypergraph communication structure, which is more general than …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012828766
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Centrality Rewarding Shapley and Myerson Values for Undirected Graph Games
Khmelnitskaya, Anna - 2020
In this paper we introduce two values for cooperative games with communication graph structure. For cooperative games … can be obtained by any coalition of players, but does not take into account the role of the players when communication … between players is restricted. Existing values for communication graph games as the Myerson value and the average tree …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012855179
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Weighted component-wise solutions for graph games
Shi, Jilei; Shan, Erfang - In: Economics letters 192 (2020), pp. 1-6
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012508772