PTAs are generally negotiated without any tariff concessions or transfers to non-member countries. Can such a PTA benefit the neighbors’ welfare? In a two-good competitive equilibrium model in the absence of an entrepôt, a PTA without concessions to the outside will hurt the outsider’s...

This paper reviews the most significant recent developments in the theory of trade agreements. The paper offers an integrated approach to evaluating trade agreements, and uses the approach to present results on preferential and multilateral trade agreements. The paper identifies also several...

This paper aims to examine the effect of reducing the import tariffs of trading partners on total and individual exports of products from three countries of the Western Balkans and individually observed for each country. In order to investigate the potential effect, this paper applied the...

This paper reviews the most significant recent developments in the theory of trade agreements. The paper offers an integrated approach to evaluating trade agreements, and uses the approach to present results on preferential and multilateral trade agreements. The paper identifies also several...

This paper investigates empirically the role of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) as determinants of migration inflows for 29 OECD countries in the period 1998-2008. By increasing information about signatory countries, PTAs are expected to drive migration flows towards member countries....

This paper investigates empirically the role of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) as determinants of migration inflows for 29 OECD countries in the period 1998-2008. By increasing information about signatory countries, PTAs are expected to drive migration flows towards member countries....

We study the optimal trade policy against a foreign oligopoly withendogenous quality. We show that, under the Most Favoured Nation(MFN) clause, a uniform tariff policy is always welfare improvingover the free trade equilibrium. However, a nonuniform tariff policyis always desirable on welfare...

This paper shows how distance may be used to coordinate on a unique equilibrium in which trade agreements are regional. Trade agreement formation is modeled as coalition formation. In a standard trade model with no distance between countries, a familiar problem of coordination failure arises...