In his ‘Simple model of herd behaviour’, Banerjee (1992) shows that – in a sequential game – if the first two players have chosen the same action, all subsequent players will ignore their own information and start a herd, an irreversible one. The points of strength of Banerjee’s model...

Seminal models of herd behaviour and informational cascades point out existence of negative information externalities, and propose to ?destroy? information in order to achieve social improvements. Although in the last years many features of herd behaviour and informational cascades have been...

Seminal models of herd behaviour and informational cascades point out existence of negative information externalities, and propose to 'destroy' information in order to achieve social improvements. Although in the last years many features of herd behaviour and informational cascades have been...

Seminal models of herd behaviour and informational cascades point out existence of negative information externalities, and propose to 'destroy' information in order to achieve social improvements. Although in the last years many features of herd behaviour and informational cascades have been...