We develop a model that is a synthesis of the two-sided markets duopoly model of Armstrong (2006) with the nested vertical and horizontal dierentiation model of Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012), which consists of a linear city with dierent consumer densities on the left and on the right side of the...

We develop a duopoly price competition model that establishes a link between the recent literature of two-sided markets and behavior economics. We fully characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which depends on the level of …xed costs. Moreover, introducing discrimination between the...

We study competition between two shopping centers (department stores or shopping malls) located at the extremes of a linear city. In contrast with the existing literature, we do not restrict consumers to make all their purchases at a single place. We obtain this condition as an equilibrium...

We introduce asymmetric information about consumers' transportation costs (i.e., the degree of product differentiation) in the model of Hotelling (1929). When the transportation costs are high, both firms have lower profits than in the case of perfect information. Contrarily, both firms may...