A conceptual model and numerical example are used to show that private property regimes are not necessarily preferable to common property regimes on efficiency grounds when: (1) agents are risk averse; (2) exogenous enforcement of risk sharing schemes is not feasible; and (3) the associated common...

It is common practice for firms to pool their expertise by forming parterships such as joint ventures and strategic alliances. A Central organizational problem in such parterships is that managers may behave noncooperatively in order to advance the interests of their parent firms. We ask whether...

This paper develops a theory of non-monetary collusion, where agents exchange favours. We examine the optimal use of information in a simple hierarchy. It is shown that when only the supervisor's information about agent is used, collusion does not arise, since favours cannot be exchanged.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how tasks should be allocated in a simple hierarchy consisting of an organizational designer and subordinates, in the framework of a principal-agent relationship with moral hazard.

The paper presents some recent research that examines, in the principal-agent framework, interaction effects of organizational design and incentives in the presence of asymmetric information and limited commitments.

In this paper we analyse the consequences of Knightian uncertainty for partnerships with symmetric linear production functions are analysed in a CEU framework. We propose an extension of Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for CEU-games with strategic uncertainty. We find that the presence of...

The purpose of this paper is to examine how tasks should be allocated in a simple hierarchy consisting of an organizational designer and subordinates, in the framework of a principal-agent relationship with moral hazard.

L'objet de cet article est de presenter une synthese de la litterature theorique concernant les interactions entre strategies financieres et strategies de production.

This is a preliminary version of a prospective book which springs from concerted effort among several researchers in the fiels of industrial economics. This chapter is devoted to the strategic role of information in oligopoly, and more broadlyn, in monotone games in general.

Markets with imperfect competition do not induce a cost-minimizing allocation of production between firms. The market's ability to rationalize production is even more limited if costs are private information to firms. Merger in such markets generate an efficiency gain associated with the pooling...