We modify a standard Baron-Myerson model by assuming that, instead of knowing the cost of nature, the agent has to incur a cost 'g' to learn it.Under these conditions, the principal will offer contracts that, dependingon the value of 'g', try to induce the agent to gather or not to gather...

We analyze a model related to the strategic hereding literature where a second expert maximises his expected second period vvalue by conforming witj a first expert ("herding"). In contrast to the herdinfg literature we assume that an agent is most valuable if he is the only smart agent. We...

In this paper we show how the order of Linear Stochastic Dominance proposed by Gollier (1995) can be applied to situations with dependent risky assets.

L'objet de cet article est de presenter une synthese de la litterature theorique concernant les interactions entre strategies financieres et strategies de production.

We investigate in this paper the attitude towards risk of bettors in British horce races. The model we use allows us to go beyond the expected utility framework and to explore various alternative proposals by estimating a multinomial model on 34443-race dataset. We find that rank-dependant...

This paper presents a patent choice model allowing strategic decisions in a sequential game with two agents: a patentholder, who perfectly knows thecharasteristics of the market, and a potential entrant who has no information about the value of demand. We study several Perfect Bayesian...

This paper shows how the instruments of incentive theory can be used to develop some views about the proper design of governments to avoid the capture of politicians and bureaucrats by interest groups.

We consider a model in which the agent faces two independant risks of losswith different probabilities of occurence and (possibly) different levels of potential loss. We show that it is optimal to select a deductable for the low probability event that is not larger than the optimal deductable...

This article investigates the issue of predation by a regulated firm. Since it has private information, a regulated firm obtains higher rents incase of successful predation: the fewer the competitors, the higher the marginal social value of the regulated firm's effort and the higher the...