Plaintiffs have either stong or weak cases. Both cases should be taken to court, yet weak cases need more work by the attorney than strong cases. Only the attorney knows whether a case needds additional work or not; the plaintiff is forced to rely on the attorney's recommendation. We show that...

In this paper we analyse the role of asymmetric information between firms and consumers about market conditions.

We study the effects of varying the confidence level of speculators and the confidence level attributed to them by their competitors, about the precision of their private information in the framework of the model of financial markets with imperfect competition a la Kyle (1989).

This paper proposes an aspiration-based model of bounded rationality, which is applied to a large-population context where agents are re-matched every period to play a Prisoner's Dilemma.

This paper presents results from experiments with finitely repeated games with complete and incomplete information. We use two treatment variables: the number of rounds the game is played and the value of the probability that reflects the presence of incomplete information.

We analyze an industry where a dominant buyer may foreclose its rivals (with whom competes a la Cournot in the final good market) from access to an efficient supplier of an intermediate good. We prove that the presence of asymmetric information between this dominant buyer and its supplier may...

This paper studies the incentives of short-lived agents to acquire costly private information in the presence of public signals arising from market interaction. It characterizes the social learning process, that is the revelation of information by public signals, and the information...