We study a general model of common-value second-price auctions with differential information. We show that one of the bidders has an inform tion advantage over the other bidders if and only if he possesses dominantstrategy. A dominant strategy is in fact unique and is given by the conditional...

It is common practice for firms to pool their expertise by forming parterships such as joint ventures and strategic alliances. A Central organizational problem in such parterships is that managers may behave noncooperatively in order to advance the interests of their parent firms. We ask whether...

Ths authors consider a first-price auction when the ranking of bidders' private valuations is common knowledge among bidders. This new informational framwork is motivated by several applications, from procurement to privatization. It induces a particular asymmetric auction model with affiliated...

First and second price collusive auction mechanisms from the literature on bid rigging within the independent private values model are extended to be applicable within the general symmetric model where signals are affiliated. A mechanism which allow information sharing is also proposed. The...

A number of recent results in mechanism design literature show that in virutally all mechanism design environments of interest, as long as agents' private information is correlated. It is possible to design mechanisms that leave agents with arbitrarily small information rents. Thus, while agents...

A profit maximising auctioneer can provide a public good to a group of agents. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides the good to the group, only if the sum of their bids exceeds a reserve...

A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to at most one of a number of groups of agents. The groups may have non-empty intersections. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides...

We consider the effect of asymmetric information on price formation process in a financial market where private information is held by a market maker. A Byesian game is proposed in which there is price competition between two market makers with two different information partition.