This paper analyzes the effect of foreign aid on illegal immigration and host country welfare using a general equilibrium model. We show that foreign aid may worsen the recipient nation's terms of trade. Furthermore, it may also raise illegal immigration, if the terms of trade effect on...

We use a version of the Meade model to consider the effects of interdependent import tariffs in the presence illegal immigration. First, we consider the small union case and derive the Nash tariff equilibrium for two potential members of a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA). We analyze...

This paper analyzes the issues of immigration and outsourcing in a general-equilibrium model of international factor mobility. In our model, legal immigration is controlled through a quota, while outsourcing is determined both by the firms (in response to market conditions) and through...

A terrorist group, based in a developing (host) country, draws unskilled and skilled labor from the productive sector to conduct attacks in that nation and abroad. The host nation chooses proactive countermeasures. Moreover, a targeted developed nation decides its optimal mix of immigration...

A terrorist group, based in a developing (host) country, draws unskilled and skilled labor from the productive sector to conduct attacks at home and abroad. The host nation chooses proactive countermeasures, while accounting for the terrorist campaign. Moreover, a targeted developed nation...