We explore the design of self-financing tax/subsidy mechanisms to solve hold-up problems in environmental regulation. Under Cournot competition, announcing the subsidy rate seems to be preferable to announcing the tax rate. Moreover, for constant marginal damage the hold-up problem can always be...

We explore the design of self-financing tax-subsidy schemes to solve hold-up problems in environmental regulation. The announcement of the tax rate seems to be preferable to solve hold-up problems with respect to the investment in environmental R&D. In contrast, only the announcement of the...

We consider the application of self-financing tax/subsidy mechanisms in environmental regulation and explore the question whether these mechanisms yield strong investment incentives in a market with many firms under Cournot competition. It turns out that the tax/subsidy mechanism with the...

Tradable Permits – a Market-Based Allocation System for the Environment. Tradable Permits and Other Environmental Policy Instruments – Killing one Bird with two Stones. Tradable Permits – Ten Key Design Issues. Tradable Permits with Imperfect Monitoring. Emissions Trading with Greenhouse...

Tradable Permits – a Market-Based Allocation System for the Environment. Tradable Permits and Other Environmental Policy Instruments – Killing one Bird with two Stones. Tradable Permits – Ten Key Design Issues. Tradable Permits with Imperfect Monitoring. Emissions Trading with Greenhouse...