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In addition to revamping existing rules for bank capital, Basel III introduces a new global framework for liquidity regulation. One part of this framework is the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), which requires banks to hold sufficient high-quality liquid assets to survive a 30-day period of...
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In addition to revamping existing rules for bank capital, Basel III introduces a new global framework for liquidity regulation. One part of this framework is the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), which requires banks to hold sufficient high-quality liquid assets to survive a 30-day period of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010193245
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We study ex post efficient policy responses to a run on the banking system and the ex ante incentives these responses create. We show that the efficient response to a run is typically not to freeze all remaining deposits, since doing so imposes heavy costs on some individuals. Instead, once a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013114962
Governments typically respond to a run on the banking system by temporarily freezing deposits and by rescheduling payments to depositors. Depositors may even be required to demonstrate an urgent need for funds before being allowed to withdraw. We study ex post efficient policy responses to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013096791
When policy makers have limited commitment power, self-fulfilling bank runs can arise as an equilibrium phenomenon. We study how such banking panics unfold in a version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model. A run in this setting is necessarily partial, with only some depositors participating....
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