We review what is known about the economic efficiency of fuel taxes relative to efficiency standards aimed at mitigating environmental externalities from automobiles. We present a simplified model of car choice that allows us to emphasize the relationships between fuel economy, other car...

Pigouvian taxes can fully correct for market failures due to externalities, but actual policies are commonly forced to deviate from the Pigouvian ideal due to administrative or political constraints. This paper derives sufficient statistics, which require a minimum of market information, that...

This paper analyzes "attribute-based regulations," in which regulatory compliance depends upon some secondary attribute that is not the intended target of the regulation. For example, in many countries fuel-economy standards mandate that vehicles have a certain fuel economy, but heavier or...

Firms sometimes comply with externality-correcting policies by gaming the measure that determines policy. We show theoretically that such gaming can benefit consumers, even when it induces them to make mistakes, because gaming leads to lower prices by reducing costs. We use our insights to...