Taxation under oligopoly is analysed in a general equilibrium setting where the firms are large relative to the size of the economy and maximise the utility of their shareholders. It turns out that the model is an aggregative game, which simplifies the comparative statics for the effects of...

Assuming constant marginal cost, it is shown that a switch from specific to ad valorem taxation has no effect on the critical discount factor required to sustain collusion. This result is shown to hold for Cournot oligopoly as well as for Bertrand oligopoly when collusion is sustained with...

Welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff is compared to free-trade welfare under perfect competition in the case of a large country able to affect its terms of trade; under Cournot duopoly with differentiated products; and under Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products. Under perfect...

In the Eaton and Grossman Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101 (1986), pp. 383-406 model of export taxes under Bertrand duopoly, it is shown that welfare in the Nash equilibrium in export taxes is always higher than welfare under free trade for both countries