Showing 1 - 4 of 4
We address the problem of learning and implementation on the Internet. When agents play repeated games in distributed environments like the Internet, they have very limited {\em a priori} information about the other players and the payoff matrix, and the play can be highly asynchronous....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005750176
We explore the relationship between public information and implementable outcomes in an environment characterized by random endowments and private information. We show that if public signals carry no information about private types, then an exact relationship holds: a more informative public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005750180
In this paper we investigate a delegation game in which the underling situation is represented by a standard Bertrand price competition. In contrast to Fershtman, Judd, and Kalai ([1987], hereafter FJK), we employ a weakly undominated SPNE as the equilibrium concept based on Shino [2012] and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010607670
In this paper we study delegation environments based on Fershtman, Judd, and Kalai ([1987], hereafter FJK). By imposing a certain assumption on the notion of implementability, called implementability with mutually rational agents, they show that every efficient outcome can be fully implemented...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010607674