interpreted as a mechanism theoretical implementation of the Nash solution. Our results in the present paper provide exact non … of the above mentioned support results, including our present ones, with mechanism theoretic implementation in (weakly … implementation can hardly be found except in very rare cases of extremely restricted domains of players' preferences. …

) implementation with partially honest agents when there are three or more participants. First, it establishes a condition which is … necessary and sufficient for implementation. Second, it provides simple tests for checking whether or not a social choice … correspondence can be implemented. Their usefulness is shown by examining implementation in a wide variety of environments. …

We extend implementation theory by allowing the social choice function to depend on more than just the preferences of … is necessary for the implementation of a social choice function f when the preferences of the agents are state … independent and sufficient for implementation for any preferences (including state dependent) with at least three agents if the …

interpreted as a mechanism theoretical implementation of the Nash solution. Our results in the present paper provide exact non … of the above mentioned support results, including our present ones, with mechanism theoretic implementation in (weakly … implementation can hardly be found except in very rare cases of extremely restricted domains of players' preferences. …

national implementation reports submitted by Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. These countries span two CCD regions as Turkey …