I: Introduction -- John E. Butterworth’s Pioneering Contributions to the Accounting and Information Economics Literature -- to the Research Papers in this Volume -- II: Information Evaluation in Multiperson Contexts -- 1. Blackwell Informativeness and Sufficient Statistics with Applications to...

We consider a principal-multi agent model that features a three-tier hierarchy, defined as a setting where the principal contracts with an agent-manager and delegates to the manager some authority to contract with other agents. A key highlight is that incentive compensation, performance...

We study three elements of management control: incentive compensation, performance monitoring, and delegation of authority to managers to contract with lower-level employees. Using a principal-agent model, we highlight important direct and indirect interactions between and among these endogenous...

We study theoretically and empirically the relation between altruism preferences and incentive contract design. Theoretically, we extend Fischer and Huddart (2008) to investigate how social norms reinforce altruism preferences, thus affecting the optimal contract design related to incentive...