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Subjective evaluations are widely used, but call for different contracts from classical moral-hazard settings. Previous literature shows that contracts require payments to third parties. I show that the (implicit) assumption of deterministic contracts makes payments to third parties necessary....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014458796
probability distortion displayed by the agent and its degree determine whether an incentivecompatible contract can be implemented …, the strength of the incentives included in the optimal contract, and the location of incentives on the output space. Our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013460007
optimal contract with a strikingly simple closed form — that efficiently motivate the same productive action. Because … incentives can be embedded in the measure or the contract, any distortions in one are offset by adjusting the other, which can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012823241
communicated might matter. In a controlled field experiment, we study a minimally invasive change in the communication of a well …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011285314
, we exploit an exogenous change in the contract structure in 2003, the piece rate increasing from 20.2 to 22.9 euros. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012202372
This paper examines the optimal provision of incentives for contract designers. A principal hires an agent to draft a … contract that is incomplete because the ex-ante specified design might not be appropriate ex-post. The degree of contract … characterize the optimal incentive scheme for the agent and discuss implications for the degree of contract incompleteness and the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013213552
with reflections on the future of relational contract theory and practice. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013500553
The standard agency model assumes that the agent does not care how his decisions influence others. This is a strong assumption, which we relax. We find that, although monetary incentives are effective also with sociallyattentive agents, the principal may optimally set none. This could explain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012268393
We develop a model of strategic contractual incompleteness that identifies conditions under which principals might omit even costlessly verifiable terms. We then use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of the model. While it is well known that verifiability imperfections can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010457849
that the principal cares for them. Principals can signal their altruism by offering a generous contract, consisting of a … agents do not reciprocate the principal's altruism, the principal may find it optimal to write a contract that simultaneously … signals his altruism and screens reciprocal worker types. I show that such a contract is characterised by excessively strong …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014045822