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Nitsan, Shemuʾel - 2011

The characteristics of endogenously determined sharing rules and the group-size paradox are studied in a model of group contest with the following features: (i) The prize has mixed private-public good characteristics. (ii) Groups can differ in marginal cost of effort and their membership size....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013128769

Prize sharing in collective contests

Nitsan, Shemuʾel; Ueda, Kaoru - 2010

The characteristics of endogenously determined sharing rules and the group-size paradox are studied in a model of group contest with the following features: (i) The prize has mixed privatepublic good characteristics. (ii) Groups can differ in marginal cost of effort and their membership size....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003962736

Incentives for cooperation in teams: sociality meets decision rights

Butz, Britta; Guillén, Pablo; Harbring, Christine - 2021

We investigate the effect of a donation incentive tied to contributions to a public good when group members can decide on the size of the donation to be made. An up to 20 % donation of the public good was implemented either exogenously or endogenously by group members. In the Vote treatment,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012494092

Prize sharing in collective contests

Nitsan, Shemuʾel; Ueda, Kaoru - In: European economic review : EER 55 (2011) 5, pp. 678-687

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009243410

Prize sharing in collective contests

Nitsan, Shemuʾel; Ueda, Kaoru - 2010

attaining the lower winning probability is the one choosing the rule giving higher incentives to the members. -- collective …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008697815

Prize Sharing in Collective Contests

Nitsan, Shemuʾel; Ueda, Kaoru - 2021

attaining the lower winning probability is the one choosing the rule giving higher incentives to the members …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316145

From Good Institutions to Generous Citizens : Top-Down Incentives to Cooperate Promote Subsequent Prosociality But Not Norm Enforcement

Stagnaro, Michael; Arechar, Antonio; Rand, David G. - 2017

What makes people willing to pay costs to help others, and to punish others’ selfishness? Why does the extent of such …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014035336

Adding Tournament to Tournament : Combining Between-Team and Within-Team Incentives

Majerczyk, Michael - 2018

We examine theoretically and experimentally how combining between-team and within-team incentives affects behavior in … team tournaments. Theory predicts that free-riding is likely to occur when there are only between-team incentives, and … offering within-team incentives may solve this problem. However, if individuals collude, then within-team incentives may not be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012921253

The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests

Schweinzer, Paul; Segev, Ella - 2008

We show that the optimal prize structure of symmetric n-player Tullock tournaments assigns the entire prize pool to the winner, provided that a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists. If such an equilibrium fails to exist under the winner-take-all structure, we construct the optimal prize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343930

Optimal and Fair Prizing in Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments : Experimental Evidence

Lauber, Arne; March, Christoph; Sahm, Marco - 2022

We report results from the ﬁrst experimental study of round-robin tournaments. In our experiment, we investigate how the prize structure aﬀects the intensity, fair-ness, and dynamic behavior in sequential round-robin tournaments with three players. We compare tournaments with a second prize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013293842