Traditionally, researchers have had difficulty testing the relationship between the degree of risk or uncertainty in workers' environments and incentive pay. The authors employ Prendergast's (2002) theory that incorporates the delegation of worker authority into the principal-agent model to...

The authors empirically test Prendergast’s (2002) theory that incorporates the delegation of worker authority into the principal-agent model to explain the lack of consistent empirical support for a tradeoff between risk and incentives. Using data from the 1998 British WERS, the authors...

This paper studies how asymmetric information over inputs affects workers' response to incentives and self-selection at the workplace. Using daily records from a Peruvian egg production plant, we exploit a sudden change in the worker salary structure and find that workers' effort, firm profits,...

Pure incentive schemes rely on agent self-interest, rather than more coercive control, to motivate subordinates. Yet most organizations, and in particular public agencies, rely very little on pure incentive contracts. Most organizations rely on the primarily coercive mechanisms of monitoring and...

Nepotism, altruism, lower managerial abilities, and a small pool of qualified family candidates may speak against family management. However, a large share of family-owned firms is run by family managers. Our study develops a theoretical model that provides an explanation for this paradox,...

Employees face volume–value trade-offs when they perform tasks with multiple characteristics, leaving them with a choice between different strategies towards the goal of maximizing the total value of their output. Either they produce many, less valuable units of output (volume strategy); or...

The term ‘incentive' (from Latin incentivum ‘something that sets the tune') is a tangible and/or intangible reward that motivates people and creates favorable environmental conditions to maximize performance to achieve specific goals in organization or competition and/or society

We investigate whether referral-based hiring exacerbates or mitigates control problems. Incentive contracts can be used to attract employees with certain traits. However, whether the outcomes are positive for the firm or not depends on the quality of incentive contracts. Our research setting...

This paper studies how pay transparency affects organizations that reward employees based on their efforts (i.e., using "subjective performance evaluation"). First, we show that transparency triggers social comparisons that require the organization to pay its employees an "envy premium". This...