Showing 1 - 10 of 23
We conduct laboratory experiments to investigate basic predictions of principal-agent theory about the choice of piece rate contracts in the presence of output risk, and provide novel insights that reference dependent preferences affect the tradeoff between risk and incentives. Subjects in our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012698074
We conduct laboratory experiments to investigate basic predictions of principal-agent theory about the choice of piece rate contracts in the presence of output risk, and provide novel insights that reference dependent preferences affect the tradeoff between risk and incentives. Subjects in our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012663086
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189874
We conduct a laboratory experiment among male participants to investigate whether rewarding schemes that depend on work performance - in particular, tournament incentives - induce more stress than schemes that are independent of performance - fixed payment scheme. Stress is measured over the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014233666
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014369441
This paper studies the impact of incentives on worker self-selection in a controlled laboratory experiment. Subjects face the choice between a fixed and a variable payment scheme. Depending on the treatment, the variable payment is a piece rate, a tournament or a revenue-sharing scheme. We find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009012616
We conduct a laboratory experiment among male participants to investigate whether rewarding schemes that depend on work performance - in particular, tournament incentives - induce more stress than schemes that are independent of performance - fixed payment scheme. Stress is measured over the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014248989
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009620360
Using a formal principal-agent model, I investigate the relation between monetary gift-exchange and incentive pay, while allowing for worker heterogeneity. I assume that some agents care more for their principal when they are convinced that the principal cares for them. Principals can signal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011379625
We conduct a field experiment among 189 stores of a retail chain to study dynamic incentive effects of relative performance pay. Employees in the randomly selected treatment stores could win a bonus by outperforming three comparable stores from the control group over the course of four weeks....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135258