We study a strict version of the notion of equilibrium robustness by Kajii and Morris (1997) that allows for a larger class of incomplete information perturbations of a given complete information game, where with high probability, players believe that their payoffs are close to (but may be...

This note demonstrates that a symmetric 3x3 supermodular game may fail to have any equilibrium robust to incomplete information. Since the global game solution in symmetric 3x3 supermodular games is known to be independent of the noise structure, this result implies that a noise-independent...

This paper considers the robustness of equilibria to a small amount of incomplete information,where players are allowed to have heterogenous priors. An equilibrium of a complete information game is robust to incomplete information under non-common priors if for every incomplete information game...

This note demonstrates that symmetric 3x3 supermodular games may fail to have any equilibrium robust to incomplete information. Since the global game solution in these games is known to be independent of the noise structure, our result implies that a noise-independent selection in global games...