A two-person infinite-horizon bargaining model where one of the players may have either of two discount factors, has a multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria. Introducing the slightest possibility that either player may be one of a rich variety of stationary behavioral types singles out a...

This article considers an intertemporal decision problem in which the agent has limited foresight. It offers an interpretation of why people may smoke when they are young - as a result of having a short horizon of foresight - and refrain from smoking when they get older - as a result of having...

This article considers an intertemporal decision problem in which the agent has limited foresight. It offers an interpretation of why people may smoke when they are youngas a result of having a short horizon of foresightand refrain from smoking when they get olderas a result of having better...

This paper considers an intertemporal decision problem in which the agent has limited foresight. It offers an interpretation of why people may smoke when they are young - and arguably have a short horizon of foresight and refrain from smoking when they get older - and their foresight is better.

This paper considers an intertemporal decision problem in which the agent has limited foresight. It offers an interpretation of why people may smoke when they are young - and arguably have a short horizon of foresight - and refrain from smoking when they get older - and their foresight is better