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Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core

Vohra, Rajiv - In: Journal of economic theory 86 (1999) 1, pp. 123-147

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001382071

Incomplete information, credibility and the Core

Dutta, Bhaskar (contributor); Vohra, Rajiv (contributor) - 2001 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001550836

Incomplete information, credibility and the core

Dutta, Bhaskar (contributor); Vohra, Rajiv (contributor) - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource], rev

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002643433

Information transmission in coalitional voting games

Serrano, Roberto (contributor); Vohra, Rajiv (contributor) - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002646412

Incomplete information, credibility and the core

Dutta, Bhaskar; Vohra, Rajiv - In: Mathematical social sciences 50 (2005) 2, pp. 148-165

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003021275

Multiplicity of Mixed Equilibria in Mechanisms : A Unified Approach to Exact and Approximate Implementation

Serrano, Roberto - 2009

We characterize full implementation of social choice sets in mixed strategy Bayesian equilibrium. Our results concern both exact and virtual mixed implementation. For exact implementation, we identify a strengthening of Bayesian monotonicity, which we refer to as mixed Bayesian monotonicity. It...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013156209

Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms : a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation

Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv - 2009

We characterize full implementation of social choice sets in mixedstrategy Bayesian equilibrium. Our results concern both exact and virtual mixed implementation. For exact implementation, we identify a strengthening of Bayesian monotonicity, which we refer to as mixed Bayesian monotonicity. It...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003897853

Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms : a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation

Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv - In: Journal of mathematical economics 46 (2010) 5, pp. 775-785

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009300200

Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms : a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation

Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003914346

Information transmission in coalitional voting games

Serrano, Roberto (contributor); Vohra, Rajiv (contributor) - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003423306