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We study the robustness of interim correlated rationalizability to perturbations of higher-order beliefs. We introduce a new metric topology on the universal type space, called uniform weak topology, under which two types are close if they have similar first-order beliefs, attach similar...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008577753
We study the robustness of interim correlated rationalizability to perturbations of higher-order beliefs. We introduce a new metric topology on the universal type space, called uniform weak topology, under which two types are close if they have similar first-order beliefs, attach similar...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014202241
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014339382
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003894733
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009124819
For different purposes, economists may use different topologies on types. We characterize the relationship among these various topologies. First, we show that for any general types, convergence in the uniform-weak topology implies convergence in both the strategic topology and the uniform...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003782141
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011920082
We study the robustness of interim correlated rationalizability to perturbations of higher-order beliefs. We introduce a new metric topology on the universal type space, called uniform weak topology, under which two types are close if they have similar first-order beliefs, attach similar...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011695239
We prove that the structure theorem for rationalizability originally from Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) applies to any finite extensive-form game with perfect recall and suitably rich payoffs. We demonstrate that the ties induced by the extensive form do not change the result of Weinstein and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049820
We study a two-sided job market matching setting with transferable utilities and incomplete information on both sides. We propose a definition of stable matching with two-sided incomplete information. Assume that the workers and firms' premuneration values in a match are strictly monotonic and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012846454