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Sustaining cooperation with correlated information : an experimental test
Bao, Yongping; Dvorak, Fabian; Fehrler, Sebastian - 2024
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015206719
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Cooperation under incomplete information on the discount factors
Maor, Cy; Solan, Eilon - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 44 (2015) 2, pp. 321-346
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378475
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Beliefs in repeated games
Aoyagi, Masaki; Fréchette, Guillaume R.; Yuksel, Sevgi - 2021
choices in each game. Moreover, we find beliefs anticipate the evolution of behavior within a supergame, changing in response …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012488895
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Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion
Matsushima, Hitoshi - In: Journal of economic theory 98 (2001) 1, pp. 158-178
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001584864
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On failing to cooperate when monitoring is private
Compte, Olivier - In: Journal of economic theory 102 (2002) 1, pp. 151-188
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001661307
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Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring
Sugaya, Takuo; Takahashi, Satoru - In: Journal of economic theory 148 (2013) 5, pp. 1891-1928
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010195601
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Robustness to incomplete information in repeated games
Chassang, Sylvain; Takahashi, Satoru - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 6 (2011) 1, pp. 49-93
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008935299
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The impact of monitoring in infinitely repeated games : perfect, public, and private
Aoyagi, Masaki; Bhaskar, V.; Fréchette, Guillaume R. - 2015
This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study the effect of a monitoring structure on the play of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. Keeping the stage game fixed, we examine the behavior of subjects when information about past actions is perfect (perfect monitoring), noisy but public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011300885
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The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games : Perfect, Public, and Private
Aoyagi, Masaki - 2015
This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study the effect of a monitoring structure on the play of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. Keeping the stage game fixed, we examine the behavior of subjects when information about past actions is perfect (perfect monitoring), noisy but public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013018397
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Common learning and cooperation in repeated games
Sugaya, Takuo; Yamamoto, Yuichi - 2019 - This version: April 26, 2019
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012064943